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WEST ON STORY AND IBEORY
L.H. LaRue*
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW. By Robin West. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 439. $49.50.

Robin West 1 is one of our most creative legal thinkers, and I, for
one, am constantly inspired by her work; she shows us new ways to
see. Her new book collects into a single volume nine essays published
in the recent past - over more or less a decade. As one would expect
from such an author, the collection has a unifying theme, and, consequently, one is invited to reflect on the brilliance of West's performance over this last decade of our lives so as to assimilate the lessons she
has taught us.
Although I say that her book has a unifying theme, perhaps it may
be controversial for me to declare wherein that unity lies; certainly,
the topics of the chapters are diverse. Consider, for example, the diversity of topics in the first four chapters. In Chapters One and Two,
West criticizes Judge Richard Posner and his arguments for the moral
significance of "choice," thereby challenging the fundamental axioms
of the law-and-economics movement (pp. 27-87). In the third chapter,
she criticizes those who see adjudication as procedurally "interpretive," thereby challenging the fundamental principles of Ronald
Dworkin's jurisprudence (pp. 89-176). The fourth chapter addresses
basic issues of feminist theory, and in it West criticizes those who
would pursue equality of rights or power as a means of achieving
"happiness" rather than set up "the pursuit of happiness" itself as the
fundamental goal; thus, she challenges the fundamental tenets of radicals such as Catharine MacK.innon and mainstream liberal feminists
who are too numerous to name (pp. 179-249). As one can see from
this preliminary sketch, West casts her net across a broad range of
topics, and so one must conclude that any unifying theme of her work
is not to be found in a single topic.
In the introduction to her book, West offers us at least one key
insight into her writing. She states that our task is to generate a "morally grounded legal criticism" and that this task is extraordinarily difficult because we are caught in a "critical dilemma" (p. 2; emphasis
omitted). The dilemma is that the values that law expresses also shape
our moral values and our political values; consequently, there is no
• Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. A.B. 1959, Washington and Lee;
LL.B. 1962, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Professor of Law, Georgetown University.
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obvious place "outside the law~' from which we can criticize the law.
In other words, we can leave the institutional venues of courthouses
and law offices, but we cannot escape their influence; we can move in
space, but the air we breathe will remain the same. Thus, the critic
who claims to offer a morally grounded legal criticism may be offering
nothing more than a legally grounded legal criticism.
Because legal values have "infected" moral values, the grand and
honorable tradition of English legal positivism - from Jeremy Bentham to H.L.A. Hart - has been unable to fulfill its ambitions (pp. 34). The positivists urged that we separate law from morality when we
analyze law so that we can criticize it, but they were blind to the obstacle of circularity. West credits the critical legal studies movement for
describing this obstacle to legal criticism with brilliance, although she
also believes that the critics have not come up with any convincing
means of overcoming the obstacle (pp. 4-7).
Where, then, should we search for a way out? West answers that
"the humanities" are the best source of guidance:
[T]his book defends both substantive and methodological claims. The
unifying substantive thesis is that, contrary to the skeptical claims of
both contemporary liberals and their post-modern critics, we can and
should rely on universal descriptions of human nature as a grounds for
criticism oflaw, as well as for social and cultural criticism. The methodological claim is that the traditional and not-so-traditional critical methods of the humanities, including the reading and interpretation of
literature, the telling and hearing of stories, and the development of a
capacity for empathizing with the experiences of others, might constitute
one means of pursuing a rich understanding of human nature and, therefore, a partial means of developing criticism of law from a genuine moral
perspective. [p. 7]

When I read these words, I was filled with admiration for the ambition and the scope of West's intentions, and I was struck once again
by how novel her vision is to the legal academy. To say that one must
seek "universal descriptions of human nature" is to speak words that
are practically heretical. Furthermore, to seek such descriptions in the
humanities instead of in the social sciences, where most legal academics are comfortable, is to be eccentric - although not alone. West is
admirably courageous; she is our Antigone, willing to face down all of
the Creons to her left and to her right who invoke social contingency
against her invocation of natural right.
In the introduction, West briefly outlines why she thinks the skeptics to her left and right are wrong, but, of course, one must read the
substantive chapters to understand her views; the introduction is too
sketchy to persuade. The principal argument in the introduction is
that the skeptics are wrong because their theses paralyze moral criticism (pp. 17-23). Unfortunately, this particular criticism is not a good
one: first, the skeptics are a rather mouthy and judgmental group, so
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their skepticism does not seem to paralyze them, even if it should;
second, if the skeptics are right in their theses, and if West is right that
the consequence is the paralysis of moral criticism, then so be it. If
our world is as opaque to moral criticism as West fears the skeptics
have made it, then our world is indeed dismal; but the mere fact that
the consequences of the skeptical arguments are distasteful is not alone
enough to disprove the skeptics.
Consequently, one must plunge into the nine substantive chapters
of the book to grapple with the richness of West's refutation of the
critics to her left and right. In these chapters, she does more than
argue that the consequences of their arguments are bad; she tries to
show that the arguments that her critics put forth so confidently ought
not to persuade us.
The unifying theme of West's work can be variously described, but
my own judgment is that it springs from lessons she drew from disputes among feminists. If my thesis is correct, then perhaps the reader
might best start with Chapter Four, "Women's Hedonic Lives,'' and
read forward from there before going back to Chapter One. Back at a
time when dumb old white guys like me were only vaguely aware that
the pot was boiling in the laboratory - or kitchen, if you prefer - of
feminism and, furthermore, had no idea of why the pot was boiling,
West was thinking deeply about the question: What should the goals
of feminism be? She labels those who decided that the goal should be
equal rights "liberal feminists,'' and those who decided that the goal
should be equal power "radical feminists." Each group imagined that
the goal of equality - of rights or of power - was the key to unlocking the door.
West, however, decided that equality was a diversion and that suffering was the real issue (pp. 185-87). Liberals and radicals argued
that equality would relieve suffering, but West refused to address the
problem so indirectly; she wanted to relieve suffering directly, even ifit
could only be relieved by embracing inequality. By now, I suspect that
one might ask how her focus on the hedonic issues of suffering versus
pleasure supplies the theme for her book. Of course, the hedonic issue
standing alone does not provide a theme. However, the way in which
West established the importance of hedonism - by hedonism she
means to claim that the statement, "That hurts," is a fundamental
moral claim - is crucial. She rests her claim on the basic methodology of feminism - women listening to other women telling stories,
and listening with empathy (pp. 219-20, 229-31). West believes that
the liberals and the radicals have fled from story to theory, that they
no longer listen to what their sisters have to say, or, if they do listen,
that they are inclined to condemn as "false consciousness" a story that
is inconsistent with their political goals; they have lost their empathy
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for any woman who does not tell the proper liberal or radical story
(pp. 242-49).
I cannot summarize the details of West's argument with liberal
feminists and radical feminists in this review, but I would like to outline her methodological argument with them; her method is what is
significant, and her method is the unifying theme of Na"ative, Authority, and Law. West describes her method in the following passage:
"My methodological assumption is that the key to moral decision
making lies in our capacity to empathize with the pain of others, and
thereby resist the source of it, and not in our capacity for abstraction,
generalization, or reason" (p. 188). This "capacity to empathize"
forms the fundamental core of feminist practice according to West, so
her basic gripe with the liberals and the radicals is that "both positions,
at critical theoretical junctures, abandon feminist practice" (p. 219). In
other words, they use normative theory to judge the worth of a story,
instead of following feminist practice by using the stories told in "consciousness-raising" to judge the theories; thus, they reason backwards,
according to West (p. 215).
If I may speculate, I would guess that West's rupture with liberal
and radical feminists was painful - a claim that I hope is not a cheap
attempt to empathize on my part. My evidence for this claim is purely
circumstantial, resting merely on the inference that _a painfully learned
lesson is a deeply learned one. West learned a lesson about the importance of feminist practice that is obviously deeply felt because it pervades the book. For example, in the first two chapters of the book, she
uses stories drawn from literature to attack Richard Posner's view of
the world (pp. 37-45, 52-58, 64-72, 81-84). Posner values the laissezfaire choices of the market, and he generalizes this theme across the
entire field of law, asking whether the law honors the choices private
actors make (pp. 31-35). But, just as West dissents from the liberal
feminist normative theory, so too she dissents from the law-and-economics normative theory. In both cases, she dissents because she listens to some stories - in Posner's case, stories by Kafka - and
because she believes the stories make the theories ring false.
In her third chapter, West dissents from one of the fundamental
premises about law and adjudication asserted by such worthy scholars
as Owen Fiss, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Grey, all of whom have
claimed that adjudication is fundamentally an interpretive act - that
is, that judges adjudicate cases by interpreting a written text or unwritten norms {pp. 89-97). West disagrees. She sees the creation of law as
an act backed by force; she sees an act of power. To be sure, one can
see some of both; the real issue is the relative weight of force and interpretation that one might discern in the law. I suspect that the average
hard-nosed social scientist would side with West's conclusion but be
shocked by the way she reaches it. West notes that the "interpre-
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tivists" have an elaborate domestic dispute among themselves over
technique and method, but she cuts through the pretensions of the
different schools by testing them against some stories by Mark Twain
and John Barth.2 As you might imagine, the claims of the interpretive
theorists sound hollow when confronted with stories.
Of course, West herself is a theorist, not a storyteller - I do not
want to create a false impression in this review. Her reliance on stories does not mean that she disdains theory; she is not an aesthete who
is repulsed by theories because they are ugly. Instead, she is a theorist
of stories; she starts with the fundamental assumption that good feminist practice will ground feminist theories in the stories that women
tell, and she wishes to generalize this feminist practice as far as she
can. Her basic questions seem to be: If our fundamental knowledge
comes from our stories, then what are the theoretical consequences of
this phenomenon? If we can listen to the stories of others and understand them, does empathy follow? If so, what are the further theoretical consequences of the capacity to have empathy?
The economists have a label for the capacity to have empathy:
they call it the intersubjective comparison of utility (p. 253), and their
official dogma is that it is a bad thing. One might regard this jargon as
a rather bizarre specimen of English, but West argues in her Chapter
Five that the economists' claim - that we cannot empathize - is the
truly bizarre feature of economic discourse. The economist - or at
least, the Posnerian economist - takes the individual's preferences as
a given, an unquestionable. There is no way to rank preferences that is
not arbitrary. But if we theorize the consequences of the human capacity for empathy, then we know that some people are in greater pain
than others; if we can know that, West argues, then we can know what
the economist says we cannot know.
I hope that the above discussion gives some indication of what one
can find in West's book and, more importantly, some understanding of
how it hangs together. Let me now turn to some criticisms. My primary difficulty with West's argument is that I am suspicious of the
distinction between theory and story. I am not sure that one can base
a theory in any straightforward way upon the narratives that people
tell. Of course, West does not explicitly make any such claim, but she
also does not explicitly exclude the possibility, and I suspect that most
readers may well interpret her analysis as a claim that one can base
theories upon the narratives that people tell. My discomfort is based
on my hunch that the relationship between theory and narrative is
circular - every theory implies a narrative, and every narrative implies a theory.
2. See pp. 108·36 (discussing MARK TwAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (1894), reprinted in
PUDD'NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE EXTRAORDINARY TWINS (Sidney E. Berger ed., 1980)); pp.
151-73 (discussing JOHN BARTH, THE FLOATING OPERA (1967)).
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However, I mean only to criticize the way in which West presents
her theses, not the validity of what she says. Let us suppose that the
relationship between theory and narrative is circular. It follows, then,
that our stories are equally as fundamental as our theories; neither one
can claim priority. Granting equal priority to both theory and story
would provide West with most of what she needs to mount her critique. If stories are just as fundamental as theories, then one can use
stories to refute theories; stories can falsify, as Karl Popper would
have it, 3 the theories of Posner, Dworkin, and MacKinnon. This thesis is powerfully argued throughout West's book, and I certainly recommend that one examine its nuances.
The relationship between stories and theories need not, of course,
be limited to the possibility that stories can falsify theories; stories can
also inspire theories. I use the word inspire deliberately; I wish to suggest that there is, perhaps, a deep psychological connection between
the stories one loves and the theories one constructs. West addresses
this topic in Chapter Eight, "Jurisprudence as Narrative," in which
she uses Northrup Frye's Anatomy of Criticism to characterize different schools of jurisprudence.4 She suggests that the polarities of tragedy versus comedy and romance versus irony illuminate the
psychology that underlies the differences we perceive in such oppositions as Posner versus Unger (pp. 373-74, 384-85). The entire chapter
is refreshing in its refusal to accept the theorists' pretensions that they
are sober and serious analysts; West shows us how to understand them
as storytellers.
Let me end by recommending-West's last chapter, "Narrative, Responsibility, and Death," which is my favorite. In that chapter, she
illuminates the necessity of both theory and story, and her demonstration should enlighten anyone who might be puzzled on this topic (pp.
426-28). The Supreme Court, in its 1990 Term, decided a series of
death penalty and habeas corpus cases (pp. 427 n.21, 429 n.23), approving death and restricting habeas. West notes that the majority
presented extended narratives of the horrible crimes and only cursorily
analyzed the doctrine, whereas the dissenters thoroughly analyzed the
doctrine but refused to give any narrative (pp. 428-35). Her judgment:
a pox on both. One needs both coherent doctrine and powerful stories. For what it is worth, I think she is right, and if you read nothing
else in the book, you should read Chapter Nine.

3. See KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS 228-31, 256 (1962).
4. Pp. 345-418 (discussing NORTHRUP FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRmCISM (1957)).

